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I.  Introduction
The purpose of the paper is to develop a general equilibrium version of the models
of Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) (GHM model).  The
motivation of the extension is twofold.  First, it extends the GHM model to absorb
the recent criticisms of the theory of incomplete contract (Hart and Moore, 1999,
Maskin and Moore, 1999, Maskin and Tirole, 1999a, b, Segal, 1999, Tirole, 1999,
Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991, and Holmstrom and Robert, 1998).  Second, the
general equilibrium model with endogenous specialization as well as endogenous
structure of property rights allows us to explore the implications of two-sided moral
hazard and structure of residual rights for the equilibrium network size of division
of labor and productivity progress. Let us motivate the two tasks one by one.
In the GHM models, ex ante indescribility of contingent states creates scope
for ex post renegotiation.  An incomplete contract that specifies the ownership
structure of assets will affect ex post bargaining power of players and therefore
generate important implications of structure residual rights for reducing distortions
caused by double moral hazard.
Maskin and Tirole (1999a, see Tirole, 1999, p. 760 as well) have shown that
with the assumption that the equilibrium monetary transfers between the parties
resulting from the renegotiation are the same whenever the states are payoff
equivalent and the assumption of strict risk aversion (together with innocuous
assumptions), the possibility of renegotiation and the indescribability of
contingencies (even combined together) do not restrict the payoffs that can be
attained through contracting.
1  In response to the indescribability irrelevance
theorem, Hart and Moore (1999) and Segal (1999) show that as the number of
contingent states tends to infinity, the optimal complete contract is a null contract.2
In the present paper, it will be shown that neither an infinite number of
contingent states nor possibility for renegotiation is essential for exploring the
implications of structure of residual rights predicted by the GHM model.  I follow
the idea of Cheung (1983) and Coase (1937) that the difference in transaction costs
between labor and goods is enough for generating the implications of structure of
residual rights in the GHM model.  Our story runs as follows.
Each individual as a consumer must consume a final good, called cloth, the
production of which requires an intermediate good, called management service, as an
input.  Each individual can choose self-provision of the two goods to avoid moral
hazard caused by transactions.  But autarkic production implies a low productivity
since economies of specialization are not fully exploited.  If individuals choose the
division of labor between specialist producers of two goods, necessary transactions
involve two-sided moral hazard.  Unobservable effort of each type of specialist in
reducing a transaction risk affects not only this person’s probability to receive good
that she buys, but also the probability for her trade partner receiving good purchased.
It is assumed that there is the trade-off between measurement cost of goods and labor
and moral hazard caused by imprecise measurement (Holmstron and Milgrom, 1991).
The measurement cost coefficient is different between two goods and labor employed
to produce different goods.
There is a tradeoff between economies of specialization and transaction costs
(including moral hazard and measurement cost).  If measurement efficiency is high,
then individuals have a greater scope for trading off among economies of
specialization, moral hazard, and measurement costs, thereby division of labor
occurring at equilibrium.  Otherwise, autarky, shown in Fig. 1(a) where ellipse with A
denotes a person choosing autarky, x is self-provided quantity of management service
and y is self-provided quantity of cloth, will be chosen as the equilibrium.
                                                                                                                                             
1 Maskin and Xu (1999) provide a survey of commitment game models (sequential equilibrium
models with information asymmetry and possible renegotiation) which provide a solid theoretical3
Figure 1: Various Structures of Transactions and Residual Rights
There are three different structures of residual rights, which can be used to
organize transactions required by the division of labor. Structure B, shown in Fig.
1(b) where the ellipse with y/x represents a person selling cloth and buying
management services and the ellipse with x/y represents a person selling management
service and buying cloth and arrowed curves represent goods flows, comprises
markets for cloth and management services.  Specialist producers of cloth exchange
that product for the specialist services of management.  For this market structure,
residual rights to returns and authority are symmetrically distributed between the
trade partners, and no firms or labor market exist.  Structure C, shown in Fig. 1(c)
where the ellipse with y/lx represents the employer who hires labor to produce
management service and then uses it to produce cloth and ellipse with lx/y represents
the employee selling labor and buying cloth, comprises the market for cloth and the
market for labor hired to produce the management service within a firm.  The dashed
ellipse represents the firm, the dot represents a process transforming labor to
management service within the firm, and arrowed curves represent flows of goods
and labor.  The producer of cloth is the owner of the firm and specialist producers of
                                                                                                                                             
foundation of renegotiation.4
management services are employees.  Control rights over employees' labor and rights
to the firm's residual returns are asymmetrically distributed between the employer and
her employees.  The employer claims the difference between revenue and the wage
bill, has decision rights over her employees' labor, and sells goods that are produced
from employees' labor.  Structure D, shown in Fig. 1(d), comprises the market for
cloth and the market for labor hired to produce cloth within a firm.  The professional
manager is the owner of the firm and specialist producers of cloth are employees. For
the final two structures of residual rights, the firm emerges from the division of labor.
Compared with structure B, these involve a labor market but not a market for
management services.  As Cheung (1983) argues, the firm replaces the market for
intermediate goods with the market for labor.  Although both structures C and D
involve a firm and an asymmetric structure of residual rights, they entail different
firm ownership structures.
Suppose that measurement efficiency is much lower for management service
than for labor.  This is very likely to be the case in the real world, since the quality
and quantity of the intangible entrepreneurial ideas are prohibitively expensive to
measure.  Potential buyers of the intellectual property in entrepreneurial ideas may
refuse to pay by claiming that these are worthless as soon as they are acquired from
their specialist-producer.  Hence, risk for delivery failure increases even for the same
effort level in reducing the transaction risk.  Under this circumstance, the institution
of the firm can be used to organize the division of labor more efficiently because it
avoids trade in intangible intellectual property.
Suppose further that measurement efficiency for labor hired to produce
management services is much lower than for labor hired to produce cloth because it is
prohibitively expensive to measure the efforts exerted in producing intangible
management services.  (Can you tell if a manager sitting in the office is pondering
business management or his girl friend?)  Therefore, the efficient balance of the
trade-off between moral hazard and monitoring cost generates more serious moral5
hazard in labor trade in structure C than in structure D.  This is because structure D
involves trade in cloth and in labor hired to produce cloth, but not trade in
management services nor in labor hired to produce management services, while
structure C involves trade in cloth and in labor hired to produce management
services.  Then the division of labor can be more efficiently organized in structure D
than in structure C.  Hence, structure D will occur at equilibrium if the measurement
efficiencies for labor hired to produce cloth and for cloth are sufficiently high.  The
claim to the residual return of the firm by the manager is the indirect price of
management services.  Therefore, the function of the asymmetric structure of residual
rights is to get the activity with the lowest measurement efficiency involved in the
division of labor while avoiding direct pricing and marketing of the output and input
of that activity, thus promoting the division of labor and productivity.  In a sense, the
function of the asymmetric structure of residual rights is similar to that of a patent law
that enforces rights to intangible intellectual property, thereby promoting the division
of labor and productivity in producing the intangible.  However, the asymmetric
structure of residual rights to returns and control can indirectly price those intangible
intellectual properties which are prohibitively expensive to price even through a
patent law.
2
Intuitively, there are two ways to do business if an individual has an idea for
making money.  The first is to sell the entrepreneurial idea in the market.  This is very
likely to create a situation in which everybody can steal the idea and refuse to pay for
its use.  The second way of proceeding is for the entrepreneur to hire workers to
realize the idea, while keeping the idea to herself as a business secret.  Then she can
claim as her reward the residual returns to the firm, which is the difference between
revenue and the wage bill.  If the idea is a good one, then the entrepreneur will make
a fortune. If the idea is a bad one, she will become bankrupt.  The residual return is
                                                
2 According to Mokyr (1990, p. 268, 1993), the legal protection of the residual rights to the firm
were more important than patent laws for technical and managerial inventions and innovations in6
the precise price of the idea and the entrepreneur gets what she deserves, so that
stealing and over-or underpricing of intellectual property is avoided.  To understand
this, you may image that Bill Gates did not set up a company to hire others to realize
his entrepreneurial ideas about how to make money from computer software. Instead,
he sold his ideas as consultant services.  Would anybody pay a billion dollars (which
is the real market value of the ideas indicated by Bill Gates residual returns) to buy
the ideas?
3
In this story, infinite contingent states, indescribability, ex post renegotiation
are not essential.  Incomplete labor contract and associated institution of the firm
can be defined as follows.  The employer has exclusive rights to a specific asset: the
name of the firm via name search in the registration process of the company.  Labor
contract between her and employees does not specify what the employer receives
from the relationship, but specifies what the employee receives.  Hence, the
employer claims the residual return which is the difference between revenue and
wage bill.  This residual right also implies that whatever produced by the employees
within the firm is owned by the employer.  In addition the employer has decision
rights to allocating employees’ labor.  This structure of asymmetric authority
implies that the employee must do whatever she is told to do.  This is consistent
with Hart’s idea about asymmetric control rights, but different from own
consumption of asset which is considered by Maskin and Tirole (1999b, p. 139) as
the essential feature of asset ownership in the GHM model.  The function of the
asymmetric decision rights is to avoid directly pricing the goods with the high
measurement cost, which is different from the function of asymmetric authority in
the literature of complete contract (Aghion and Tirole, 1997).  Such labor contract
can be considered as incomplete contract since it requires the employee to do
                                                                                                                                             
British industrialization.
3 If more layers of principal-agent relationships are introduced, the division of labor between
production management and portfolio management may be associated with shareholders being the7
whatever she is asked to do rather than specifying what exactly the employee must
do.  However, the labor contract has a feature of complete contingent contract: the
employee receives a higher wage when the business goes well than when business
is bad.
Hence, our model is to formalize Cheung and Coase’s theory of the firm that
emphasizes the implications of the difference in measurement efficiency among
different goods and factors rather than Willimson’s (1975) idea about holding up
and related opportunism.  Our model absorbs Holmstrom and Roberts (1998) and
Holmstrom and Milgrom’s (1991, 1995) criticism of the model of incomplete
contract that labor contract is inessential in the GHM model.  Also, their idea on the
trade-off between moral hazard and monitoring or measurement cost is absorbed.
In the GHM models, the pattern of division of labor between players is
exogenously given, so that the implications of structure of residual rights for the
network size of division of labor cannot be explored.  In a general equilibrium
environment, individuals’ decisions in choosing their levels of specialization are
dependent on endogenous transaction costs caused by moral hazard and on
structure of residual rights, while the level of the endogenous transaction cost itself
is determined by individuals’ levels of specialization.  For instance, if all
individuals choose autarky, endogenous transaction cost is zero because of the
absence of transactions in autarky.  Hence, we need a general equilibrium model to
figure out a mechanism that simultaneously determines the interdependent level of
endogenous transaction cost and network size of division of labor.
The simultaneous endogenization of transaction cost and network size of
division of labor can be motivated by Houthakker and George Stigler’s following
statements.  Houthakker claims (1956): “there is hardly any part of economics that
would not be advanced by a further analysis of specialization.”  This claim implies
                                                                                                                                             
owners of the firm. A recent survey of the literature of multiple layers of principal-agent
relationships can be found from Gibbons (1998).8
that studies of specialization is not merely a field of economics, but rather it is the
core of mainstream economics.  However, Stigler noted (1976):
“… almost no one used or now uses the theory of division of labor, for the
excellent reason that there is scarcely such a theory. … there is no standard,
operable theory to describe what Smith argued to be the mainspring of economic
progress.  Smith gave the division of labor an immensely convincing presentation –
it seems to me as persuasive a case for the power of specialization today as it
appeared to Smith.  Yet there is no evidence, so far as I know, of any serious
advance in the theory of the subject since his time, and specialization is not an
integral part of the modern theory of production.”
Since the late 1970s, many works have been developed to fill the gap noted by
Stigler (see a survey on the literature on specialization and division of labor by
Yang and S. Ng, 1998 and references there).  But in the literature, transaction costs
are exogenous.  This paper will apply inframarginal analysis developed in the
literature of endogenous specialization and in the literature of incomplete contract
to simultaneously endogenize individuals’ levels of specialization and transaction
costs.
As Allyn Young (1928) noted, economies of division of labor are typical
network effect rather than economies of scale.  Hence, partial equilibrium model is
not appropriate for an investigation of equilibrium network size of division of labor.
In order to explore the implications of endogenous transaction costs for the
equilibrium network size of division of labor and related productivity, we need to
develop a general equilibrium version of the GHM model.
4  The extended GHM
                                                
4 Previous studies of general equilibrium models of moral hazard can be found from, for instance,
Helpman and Laffont (1975), Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979), and Legros and Newman (1996), which
do not focus on implications of structure of residual rights for the equilibrium network size of
division of labor.9
model predicts Pareto improving increases in moral hazard as a result of improved
monitoring efficiency, which enlarges the scope for trading off one against the
others among positive network effect of the division of labor on aggregate
productivity, moral hazard, and monitoring costs.  Hence, the general equilibrium
discontinuously jumps from autarky where there is no transaction and related moral
hazard to the division of labor where aggregate productivity and welfare are higher
and moral hazard occurs. The Pareto improving increase in moral hazard provides a
rationale for concurrent increases in per capita real income and income share of
transaction cost, observed by North (1985).  The model in this paper also formalizes
Cheung (1983), and Coase (1937), and Stigler’s (1953) theory of irrelevance of the
size of the firm, which is supported by empirical evidences provided by Liu and
Yang (2000) and Murakami, Liu, and Otsuka (1996).  This theory states that the
average size of firms increases if division of labor develops within firms and it
decreases if division of labor develops among firms.
Section II specifies a general equilibrium model with endogenous specialization
and endogenous structure of residual rights.  All possible structures of transactions
and residual rights are enumerated and local equilibrium in each structure is solved
in section III.  Then the general equilibrium and its comparative statics are solved in
section IV.  The final section summarizes the findings of the paper.
II. A General Equilibrium Version of the GHM Model
Consider a model with a continuum of ex ante identical consumer-producers of
mass M, consumption good y and intermediate good x, which is used to produce y.
Each person’s utility function is:
(1) u = y+ky y
d10
where y is the amount of the final good self-provided, y
d is the amount of the good
purchased from the market.  The fraction 1-ki  ∈ (0, 1) of good i purchased
disappears in transit because of transaction risk.  Hence, ki is the fraction of one unit
of good i that is received by the buyer.  Or ki can be considered as a trading
efficiency coefficient of good i. ki is a contingent variable because of transaction
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where si is the effort level of a buyer of good i in avoiding transaction risk and
i=x,y. (2a) implies that the trading efficiency for an exchange between x and y is
determined by two trade partners’ efforts in avoiding the transaction risk.  Hence,
each partner’s effort not only affects her trading efficiency, but also affects the
other party’s trading efficiency.  But if the effort is not observable or not verifiable,
then each player may ignore the effect of her effort on the other party, so that two-
sided moral hazard arises.
θ i can be considered as negatively dependent on exogenous transaction cost in
measuring quantity and quality of goods i.  In other words, for the same effort
levels  sx and sy, as the difficulty in measuring quantity and quality of good i
decreases, the trading efficiency coefficient ki = θ i, which occurs with probability
sxsy, increases.  This is a simple way to formalize the trade-off between moral
hazard and measurement cost. As the measurement cost decreases, moral hazard
may decrease even if the effort level for avoiding transaction risk is fixed.  A more
complicated way to specify the trade-off is to specify labor cost in measuring
goods.  Other sophisticated ways to specify the trade-off between moral hazard and
monitoring cost can be found from, for instance, Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991,
1995), Milgrom and Roberts (1992), and Aghion and Tirole (1997).
Because of a great structure variety of transactions and the distinction between
ex ante and ex post production conditions (drawn by Rosen, 1978, see also, Yang,11
2000, ch. 8) in the model of endogenous specialization, structure of production
functions depends on structure of transactions. Hence, I first specify the production
conditions in the absence of labor market.  The ex post production conditions after
individuals choose a structure with labor market will be specified later on.  Each
person is equipped with the same production functions for the two goods and the
endowment constraint for working time.
(3) x
p ≡  x+x
s = Max{Lx-α , 0}, y
p ≡  y+y
s = Max{(x+ kxx
d )
β  (Ly-α ), 0}
Lx+Ly +sx+sy = 1,
where si is the effort level of a buyer of good i exerted in avoiding transaction risk
of good i.  It is trivial to show that si is zero iff i
d = 0 or iff the individual does not
buy good i. x is the amount of the intermediate good self-provided and x
d is the
amount of the intermediate good purchased from the market, and kx  ∈ (0, 1), a
contingent variable, is the trading efficiency coefficient for the intermediate goods.
x
s and y
s are respective quantities of the two goods sold. x
p and y
p are respective
output levels of the two goods. Li is an individual’s quantity of labor allocated to
the production of good i.  α  is a fixed learning cost in producing each good.  The
system of production functions and endowment constraint (1b) displays economies
of specialization which exist if the labor productivity or total factor productivity of
an individual in producing a good increases as her amount of labor allocated to the
production of that good increases.  Economies of specialization differ from
economies of scale for it is associated with diseconomies of an individual’s scope
of production activities.  It is individual specific and does not extend beyond the
scale of an individual’s working time and it cannot be obtained by simply pooling
labor together in the absence of workers’ specialization within the firm.
Aggregation of individuals’ economies of specialization generate economies of
division of labor for society as a whole.  The difference between economies of
division of labor and economies of scale was drawn by Allyn Young (1928) and12
Yang (1994).
5  The difference and connection between individual specific
economies of specialization and economies of division of labor for society as a
whole is drawn by Yang and Ng (1993) and Yang (1994).
There are 2
6 = 64 profiles of positive and zero values of decision variables x, x
s,
x





p,  Lx,  Ly  ,  sx,  sy are not independent of the other six decision
variables).  Hence, there are 64 possible corner and interior solutions for each
individual in making a plan of production, trade, and consumption.  According to
theorem 1 in Borland and Yang (1995, see also Sun, 1999), for a Walrasian
equilibrium model with consumer-producers, economies of specialization, and
transaction costs each consumer-producer’s optimum decision can be achieved by
not simultaneously buying and selling or producing the same good and by selling at
most one good.  Consider the budget constraint and positive utility constraint in
addition to this theorem, each individual needs to consider only three
configurations of production, trade, and consumption in the absence of labor trade:







specialization in x, denoted by (x/y), which implies x
s,
 y
d, sx, Lx >0, x = x




 = 0; and specialization in y, denoted by (y/x), which implies y, y
s,
 x
d, sy, Ly >0,
y
d = x = x
s = Lx
 = sx
 = 0.  Configurations (x/y) and (y/x) are shown in Fig. 1(b).
Combinations of those configurations that are compatible with the market
clearing conditions constitute several market structures or structures for short.
Structure autarky (A), shown in Fig. 1(a), occurs if M individuals choose
configuration A. Structure B (division of labor), shown in Fig. 1(b), occurs if the
population is divided between configurations (x/y) and (y/x). I assume that measure
of individuals selling good i is Mi, which are endogenously determined by the
utility equalization condition in a competitive equilibrium process.
                                                
5 Young (1928, p. 539) stated "The mechanism of increasing returns is not to be discerned adequately
by observing the effects of variations in the size of an individual firm or of a particular industry, for
the progressive division of labor and specialization of industries is an essential part of the process by13
In structure B, complete contingent contracts of goods are used to organize the
division of labor and reciprocal and bilateral principal-agent relationships (an x
specialist is an agent of y specialist in producing x and is a principal of an y
specialist in producing y).  Players sign complete contingent contracts and each
player chooses her allocation of labor between production and transaction activities
to maximize expected utility before a state of trading efficiency coefficient k is
realized.  After a state of k is realized, players deliver goods according to contracts.
Note that with probability sxsy the two types of specialists trade x for y at a positive
relative price and that with probability 1-sxsy the specialist producer of y fails to
receive the intermediate good x, so that the production of y cannot take place, that
is, each individual receives zero utility.  The transaction condition is given in (2a).
The assumption that there are only two contingent states of ki and one of the states
generates zero utility significantly simplifies the algebra.  In the future research, the
assumption may be relaxed to allow for four contingent states of k which is
determined by the two specialists’ decisions in choosing si.  For instance, k = θ hh
with probability sxsy, k = θ hl with probability sx (1-sy), k = θ l h with probability (1-
sx)sy, and k = θ ll with probability (1-sx)(1-sy).
In structure C, shown in Fig. 1(c), a specialist producer of y is the owner of a
firm producing and selling the final good y and hiring labor to produce good x
within the firm.  In this structure, the trading efficiency coefficient for the final
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respectively, where sy  is the employee’s (x specialist’s) effort level in reducing
transaction risk in buying good y and rx is the employer’s (y specialist’s) effort level
                                                                                                                                             
which increasing returns are realized.” He argued (p. 533) that the use of the notion of large-scale-
production misses the phenomenon of economies of division of labor.14
in reducing transaction risk in buying labor, µ x represents monitoring and
measuring efficiency of the labor used to produce x.  The labor contract between
the x specialist and the y specialist is an incomplete contract in the following sense.
It does not specify exactly what the employee must produce.  Instead, it specifies
that the employee must do whatever the employer asks her to do and the employer
owns goods produced by her and her employees before selling them in the market.
Also, the labor contract specifies contingent wage rates that the employee receives,
but does not specify what the employer receives from the relationship.  In other
words, the employer has control rights to the employee’s labor allocation and
claims residual returns of the firm.  But this incomplete contract with asymmetric
authority and asymmetric residual returns is mixed with complete contingent
contract in terms of Maskin and Tirole’s definition of the term.  If business goes
well (with probability syrx), the employee receives a positive wage.  If business is
not good (with probability 1-syrx), the employee receives 0 wage rate.  Hence, the
labor contract in this structure is a mixture of Hart’s incomplete contract which
specifies ownership structure of assets and conventional complete contingent
contact.
The two features of the incomplete labor contract here deserve particular
attention.  First, when the ex ante ownership structure of x and y is specified in the
incomplete contract, x and y are yet to be produced.  This, together with the fact
that the employee does not know what exactly she is supposed to produce ex ante,
has a flavor of the GHM model with unforeseen contingent states.  However, the
infinite number of contingent states is not needed for justifying the function of the
labor contract in this model.
The second feature relates to the definition of the firm.  Here, institution of the
firm is defined as a structure of transactions that satisfies the following conditions.
(i) There are two types of trade partners who are associated with a firm:
employers and employees.  There is an asymmetric distribution of decision rights or15
authority.  The employer has decision rights to use the employee’s labor.  “Decision
rights” here implies that ultimate rights to use the employee’s labor is owned by the
employer subject to the employee’s freedom to quit the job and to other terms of
labor contract.  A labor contract is an incomplete contract as discussed above.  This
incompleteness of labor contract is purposely created in order to protect the
employer’s rights to intangible intellectual properties and prevent them from being
stolen by the employee.  When an employer-entrepreneur directs the employee to
take some action, the latter actually uses the former’s idea as an input to produce
some final goods.  But different employees just get a very small part of the whole
idea.  The incompleteness of the labor contract prevents the employee to get the
whole idea.  Hence, inefficient direct trade and pricing of intangible ideas are
avoided.  Here, bilateral monopoly between the employer and the employee,
discussed by Maskin and Tirole (1999a, b) and Tirole (1999),  is not essential.
Each employer can turn to other potential employees in labor market and each
employee can turn to other potential employers.
(ii) The employer claims the residual returns that is the revenue net of wage bill
and other cost of the firm.  The employer is referred to as the owner of the firm.
One of the most important components of the ownership of a modern firm is the
entitlement to the business name of the firm.  The exclusive rights to the business
name is enforced through the business name search process and recognition of the
name in the legal cases in the judicial process.  The exclusive rights are also
enforced through laws of brand.  This has a flavor of Hart and Williamson’s notion
of ownership of specific asset.  However, the ownership of other tangible assets
here is not essential as long as all production factors other than intangible
intellectual properties (entrepreneurial ideas, reputation, client base, and so on) can
be precisely priced (via renting and hiring).  Here, monopolistic possession of
specific physical assets is inessential.  For instance, if an entrepreneur founds a
copying shop, she uses the institution of the firm to protect her rights to the good16
will of doing business, client base, and her idea to align location of shop, machines,
and clients in a right way.  But she may not have any ownership of physical assets
(copy machines may be hired from another company and real estate may be rented
too).  But exclusive rights to the business name can be considered as essential
ownership of specific assets for the firm.
(iii) A firm must involve a process that transforms labor of the employee into
something that is sold by the owner of the firm in the market.  In the process, what
is produced by the employee is owned by the employer (residual returns).
The relationship between a professor and her housekeeper does not involve the
institution of the firm although it has features (i) and (ii) since it does not have
feature (iii).  The professor directly consumes what the housekeeper produces and
she does not resell it to the market.  If an individual hires a broker to conduct stock
exchanges, the relationship involves asymmetric rights to control and to residual
returns.  But the relationship does not involve the firm since it does not satisfy
condition (iii).  This definition of institution of the firm is consistent with the spirit
of the GHM model that incomplete contract that specifies ex ante ownership
structure of goods makes a difference on the one hand.  It has absorbed Holmstrom
and Milgrom’s criticism of the model of incomplete contract by well defining labor
contract and institution of the firm, on the other.
In structure C, incomplete contingent labor contracts are used to organize the
division of labor.  Players sign incomplete labor contracts before a state of trading
efficiency coefficient is realized.  If state with ky= θ y and tx = µ x is realized, a
positive relative price of labor in terms of the consumption good is implemented.  If
state with ky = 0 or tx = 0 is realized, prices are irrelevant and players’ utilities are
zero.  After the incomplete contingent labor contract is signed, an employee
allocates her labor between sale in the labor market and reduction of transaction
risk.  Then the x specialist (the owner of a firm) directs labor that she receives to
the production of good x, and allocates her own labor between production and17
transaction activities to maximize her expected utility.  After states of ky and tx are
realized, players deliver goods according to the contracts.  In this economy with a
continuum of individuals, we may assume that in an equilibrium the fraction syrx of
total population end up with a positive wage in terms of y and the rest of population
end up with 0 utility.
Compared with structure B, the moral hazard in the market for intermediate good
x in structure B is replaced by the moral hazard in labor market in structure C.  This
formalizes Cheung’s (1983) refinement of Coase’s theory of the firm that the
institution of the firm is to replace transaction costs of intermediate good with
transaction costs of labor rather than replacing market with non-market institution.
The structure of ownership and residual rights makes a difference because the
parameter that relates to measuring or monitoring efficiency of intermediate good θ x
(relevant only to structure B) differs from that related to monitoring efficiency of
labor, µ x (relevant only to structure C).
In structure D, shown in Fig. 1(d), a specialist producer of x is the owner of a
firm selling y and hiring labor to produce y.  She owns goods produced by her and
her employees before selling them.  Specialist producers of x exchange y for labor
used to produce y.  In this structure, the trading efficiencies for the final good and
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1 y  probabilit  with  0
y  probabilit  with 
respectively, where µ y relates to the monitoring and measuring efficiency of labor
used to produce y, which is different from µ x in (2b) that relates to the monitoring
and measuring efficiency of labor used to produce x.  Note that good y and labor
used to produce y must be measured and priced in structure D.
A Walrasian regime is assumed since economies of specialization are individual
specific or increasing returns are localized, all individuals are ex ante identical in
all aspects, and they are allowed to choose between different patterns of18
specialization and different contractual structures.  As shown by Sun (1999), a
general equilibrium may not exist if the set of consumer-producers  is finite, and a
general equilibrium exists if the set of consumer-producers is a continuum and the
following assumptions hold in such a model.  Preferences are rational, increasing,
and continuous, production functions of intermediate goods are continuous and
weakly increasing, production functions of consumption goods may exhibit at most
local increasing returns, and transaction functions, which are kxx
d and kyy
d in this
paper, are continuous and weakly increasing.
Since the interior solution is never optimal and the optimum values of decision
variables are not continuous across structures, marginal analysis does not work for
this model.  A two-step inframargianal analysis is then used to solve for the general
equilibrium.  In the first step (section III), each individual uses marginal analysis to
solve for a corner solution in a given configuration, which sorts out the efficient
resource allocation for a given configuration of specialization.  The corner solution
generates indirect expected utility function for each configuration.  Then for each
structure, the market clearing conditions for traded goods and utility equalization
condition between different constituent configurations generate a set of contingent
relative prices of traded goods and a set of numbers (measures) of individuals
choosing different configurations within a structure.  We call them, together with
quantities produced, traded, and consumed of goods under the contingent contract,
the  corner (partial or local) equilibrium for the given structure.  Plugging the
corner equilibrium relative prices and number of different specialists into the
individual optimum plans of production, trade, and consumption, the corner
equilibrium resource allocation for a given structure of division of labor can be
found.
In the second step (section IV), the corner equilibrium terms of contract in a
given structure are plugged into the expected utility functions.  Expected utility of
each constituent configuration in this structure is compared with all other19
alternative configurations to identify the condition under which each individual has
no incentive to deviate from her chosen configuration in this structure.  This so-
called total cost-benefit analysis can then be conducted for each corner equilibrium
to partition the parameter space into several subspaces within each of which a
corner equilibrium is the general equilibrium.
III. Corner Solution for a Configuration, Corner Equilibrium for
a Structure
We first solve for the corner equilibria in structures A (autarky), B, C, and D.
(A) The decision problem in structure A is
Max: u = y = x
β  (Ly -α )=  ( Lx-α )
β  (1-Lx-α )
Its solution is Lx = [(1-α )β +α ]/(1+β ) and U(A) =β
2β /[(1-2α )/(1+β )]
1+2β , where U(A)
is the maximum per capita real income in structure A.
(B) The decision problem for a specialist of x in structure B is






s = Lx -α (production function of x)










- 1 y  probabilit  with  0




d, sy are decision variables and p≡ px/py is the price of good x in terms
of good y.  sx is given by the decision of the buyer of x who is the y specialist.  The
solution of this decision problem yields optimum values of  Lx, x
s, y
d, sy, and
expected indirect utility function of this configuration for a given positive realized
value of p≡ px/py.20
The decision problem for a y specialist in structure B is
Max: Uy ≡  Euy = y (utility function)
s.t. y+y
s = (kx x
d)














- 1 y  probabilit  with  0




s, y, sx are decision variables.  sy is given by the decision of the buyer
of good y who is the x specialist.  The solution of this decision problem yields
optimum values of Ly, x
d, y
s, y, sx and expected indirect utility function for this
configuration as functions of contingent p.
For a continuum of individuals, the law of large number implies that in
equilibrium, sysxM individuals end up with realized state of kx = θ x and ky = θ y, while
(1-sysx)M individuals end up with realized state of kx = 0 or ky = 0, which implies
that the deal fails to be substantiated and therefore the relative price p is irrelevant,
utility levels are 0.  For the realized state of kx = θ x and ky = θ y, the market clearing
conditions  Myy
s=  Mxy
d, the population equation Mx + My = M,  and utility
equalization condition Ux = Uy yield the corner equilibrium in structure B
p = [βθ x(1-α )]
β  [2(1-β )/θ y]
1-β /(2-β ),
Mx = [2/(1-α )]
β  [θ y/(1-β )]
1-β β
1-2β M/{1+[2/(1-α )]
β  [θ y/(1-β )]
1-β β
1-2β },
My = M/{1+[2/(1-α )]
β  [θ y/(1-β )]
1-β β
1-2β },
sy = (1-α )/2, sx = (1-α )(1-β )/(2-β ), x
s = (1-α )/2,
y
s = p x
d, x
d = [(1-α )βθ x
β /(2-β )p]
 1/(1-β ), y
d = (1-α )/2p,
U(B)= (1-α )
3+β (1-β )




where U(B) is the expected per capita real income in structure B.
Before solving for the corner equilibria in other two structures, let us establish
the claim that the corner equilibrium in structure B is not locally Pareto optimal.  To
see this, an allocation that is locally Pareto superior to the corner equilibrium in B21
can be found by maximizing expected utility in configuration (x/y) subject to the
constraints that expected utility in (x/y) equals that in (y/x) and total consumption
equals total production.  I assume that a benevolent dictator uses the utility
equalization condition to express p as a function of other decision variables and
uses material balance constraints to eliminate as many variables as possible.  Then
she maximizes expected utility of a configurations with respect to all remaining
decision variables in structure B.
It is not difficult to show that the optimum expected per capita real income
solved by the dictator is












1-β  > 0, which always holds for α , β∈ (0, 1).  In this model
with two-sided moral hazard, each specialist’s trading efficiency depends not only
on her own effort level, but also on her partner’s effort level in reducing transaction
risk.  Because of moral hazard, each player ignores the interdependence of the
decisions, so that effort level in avoiding transaction risk is not Pareto optimal.  The
difference between U* and U(B) is the endogenous transaction costs caused by
two-sided moral hazard in structure B.
(C) In structure C, an y specialist is the owner of a firm.  She hires N workers
and directs them to specialize in producing y in the firm.  She owns all goods
produced by her and her employees and claims residual returns.  She pays a
contingent market wage rate to her employees and has decision rights to use her
employees’ labor.  The decision problem for her is
Max: Uy ≡  Euy= Ey (utility function)
s.t. y
s = wN (budget constraint)
x




β  (1-rx-α ) (production condition of employer-specialist of y)
x
d = Nx










- 1 y  probabilit  with  0





s, N, rx are the employer’s decision variables, though x
s is the
consequence of employees’ actions under the employer’s direction.  sy is given by
the decision of the buyer of y who is an employee (x specialist), w is the wage rate
in terms of the final good.  The employer buys 1-sy unit of labor from each
employee, but only a fraction tx of that labor is actually employed by the employer.
The employer directs each employee to allocate tx(1-sy) of labor to the production of
x.  The optimum decision for this configuration yields demand function for labor
and supply function of y, and expected indirect utility function.  Since, there are
only two production activities in this model, the employer’s control rights in using
the employee’s labor seems trivial.  If there are more goods and the employee
engages in more than one production activity in the model, the employer’s control
rights of the employee’s labor will be nontrivial.
Note that the production function for the firm is a combination of the employer
and employees’ individual specific production functions.  In other words, the
employer hires employees’ production functions and combines them with her own
production function to generate a production function for the firm.  This
differentiates the model in this paper from other neoclassical model of production
and differentiates the notion of economies of division of labor from the neoclassical
concept of economies of scale.23





































sy = (1-α )/2,
sx = (1-α )(1-β )/(2-β ),
x

























sy = Lx = 0.5,
rx = (1-α )(1-β )/(2-β ),
x






















= (1-β )θ y/β
sy = Ly =  0.5,















β (0.5µ y-α )2
-β -2
The decision problem for an employee is
Max: Ux ≡  Eux = E(kyy
d)
s.t. y










- 1 y  probabilit  with  0
y  probabilit  with 
(trading efficiency of y)
The optimum decision is: sy = (1-α )/2 and Ux = θ ywrx/2.  The market clearing and
utility equalization conditions yield the corner equilibrium in structure C,
summarized in Table 1.  It should be noted that structure C with the firm replaces
moral hazard in the market for good x with moral hazard in the market for labor.
(D) Structure D is symmetric to structure C.  The only difference is that
specialist producers of x rather than specialist producers of y are owners of firms in
structure D.  The corner equilibrium in structure D is reported in Table 1.
Following the method to show that the corner equilibrium in structure B is not
locally Pareto optimal, we can show that the corner equilibria in structures C and D
are not locally Pareto optimal.  The efficient trade off between exogenous24
monitoring costs, which relate to θ , µ , and endogenous transaction costs caused by
moral hazard in different structures of transactions and residual rights determines
the general equilibrium and its comparative statics.
IV. General Equilibrium and Its Inframarginal Comparative Statics
I now consider the second step of the inframarginal analysis.  Inserting corner
equilibrium contractual terms in a structure into the expected utility function, each
individual can compare her expected utility in a constituent configuration in this
structure with all other alternative configurations.  Letting expected utility in each
constituent configuration be not smaller than in any alternative configurations
yields a system of inequalities that specifies a parameter subspace within which the
corner equilibrium in this structure is a general equilibrium (or individuals have no
incentive to deviate from the corner equilibrium).  Taking structure B as an
example.  The condition under which an individual has no incentive to deviate from
configuration (x/y) in structure B requires
(4a) Ux(B) ≥  Uy(B), Ux(C), Ux(D), Uy(C) Uy(D), U(A).
where Ui(j) is the expected utility function for a specialist producing good i in
structure j under the corner equilibrium contractual terms in structure B.  The
condition under which an individual has no incentive to deviate from configuration
(y/x) in structure B requires
(4b) Uy(B) ≥  Ux(B), Ux(C), Ux(D), Uy(C) Uy(D), U(A).
Ux(B) ≥  Uy(B) in (4a) and Uy(B) ≥  Ux(B) in (4b) imply Uy(B) = Ux(B) = U(B),
where per capita real income in structure B, U(B), is given in Table 1. This,
together with Ux(B) ≥   Ux(C), Uy(C), imply
(5a) U(B) ≥  0.5θ y(1-α )(1-β )w/(2-β ) and
U(B) ≥  0.5[2(1-α )(0.5µ x-α )β /w(2-β )]
β /(1-β )[(1-α )(1-β )/(2-β )]
2,25
(5a) can be rearranged as follows.
(5b) 2U(B)(2-β )/θ y(1-α )(1-β ) ≥  w
≥  2{[(1-α )(1-β )/(2-β )]
2/2U(B)}
(1-β )/β (1-α )(0.5µ x-α )β /(2-β )
where w is the corner equilibrium wage rate in terms of good y in structure B. For
any finite positive value of w, (5b) holds only if U(B) > U(C) where U(C) is the per
capita real income in structure C, given in Table 1. Similarly, it can be shown that
Ux(B) = U(B) ≥   Ux(D), Uy(D) in (4) hold, only if  U(B) > U(D). Hence, (4) holds
only if U(B) > U(C), U(D), U(A), or only if
(6) θ x/θ y(0.5µ x-α ) > 4/(1-α )
(1+β )/β , θ x
β /(0.5µ y-α ) > 0.5[(2-β )(1-β )
1-β /(1-α )]
2,







(6) defines a parameter subspace within which the corner equilibrium in structure B
is the general equilibrium.  The second step is referred to as total cost-benefit
analysis.  Inframarginal analysis consists of marginal analysis of each corner
equilibrium in the first step and total cost-benefit analysis in the second step.
Following this procedure, we can identify parameter subspaces within which
structures A, C, and D, respectively, occur in equilibrium.  The inframarginal
comparative statics of general equilibrium are summarized in Table 2 and
proposition 1.
Table 2: General Equilibrium and Inframarginal Comparative Statics
θ x/(0.5µ x-α ) > b1 and
θ x
β θ y
2β -1/(0.5µ y-α ) > b2
θ x/(0.5µ x-α ) < b1 and
(0.5µ x-α )
β (0.5µ y-α )θ y




2β -1/(0.5µ y-α ) < b2 and
(0.5µ x-α )




θ xθ y < c1 θ xθ y > c1 θ y(0.5µ x-α ) <
c2
θ y(0.5µ x-α )
> c2
θ y




α ) > c3
Equilibrium
structure A B A C A D
where b1 ≡  4/(1-α )
(1+β )/β , b2 ≡  0.5[(2-β )/(1-α )]
2/(1-β ),











c2 ≡  β {[(1-2α )/(1+β )]
1+2β 2




c3 ≡  β






(1) The corner equilibrium in structure A is the general equilibrium if θ x, θ y, µ x, and
µ y are sufficiently small.
(2) The corner equilibrium in structure B is the general equilibrium if θ x and θ y are
sufficiently large, compared to µ x and µ y.
(3) The corner equilibrium in structure C is the general equilibrium if µ x and θ y are
sufficiently large, compared to θ x and µ y.
(4) The corner equilibrium in structure D is the general equilibrium if µ y and θ y are
sufficiently large, compared to θ x and µ x.
1-θ i and 1-µ i relate to exogenous monitoring or measurement costs of good i and
labor employed to produce good i, respectively.  Consider, for instance, 1-ki = 1-θ i
with probability 1-sxsy in structure B.  This implies that with fixed effort levels of
the two types of specialists sx, sy in reducing transaction risk, the transaction cost 1-
θ i is lower as parameter θ i increases.  The increase in θ i may be due to an increase
in monitoring and measuring efficiency of quantity and quality of goods.  Hence θ i
can be considered as an exogenous monitoring or measurement efficiency
coefficient for good i and µ i can be interpreted as that for labor employed to
produce good i.  But an increase in θ i or in µ i will affect the decisions in choosing
sx, sy, thereby affecting the endogenous transaction cost (or degree of moral hazard)
in a structure which is defined by the difference between the Pareto optimum and a
corner equilibrium in the structure.27
Proposition 1 indicates that monitoring or measurement efficiency determines if
autarky or division of labor is the general equilibrium.  Relative measurement
efficiency between goods and labor determines if the division of labor is organized
by the complete contingent contracts in the market for goods or the incomplete
contingent contract in labor market.  If labor is cheaper to measure (thereby labor
contract involving a lower degree of moral hazard) than goods, then the institution
of the firm emerges from the division of labor.  Otherwise, labor trade and
asymmetric structure of residual rights to returns and decision authority will not
occur in equilibrium.  The essence of our story of the firm and residual right is that
any two elements of outputs of two goods (x and y) and labor employed to produce
the two goods (Lx and Ly) can be used to organize the division of labor between the
production of x and the production of y.  If the division of labor occurs in
equilibrium, the one out of the three possible structures of transactions that involves
the lowest moral hazard will occur in the general equilibrium, so that division of
labor will be promoted.  As the number of production activities involved in the
division of labor increases, the number of possible structures of transactions will
increase more than proportionally.  Then choice of structure of residual rights and
ownership becomes increasingly more important for achieving a higher level of
division of labor and related greater extent of the market and productivity.
Proposition 1 suggests that as measurement efficiency is improved within a
certain parameter sub-space, the general equilibrium discontinuously jumps from
locally Pareto efficient corner equilibrium in A to a locally Pareto inefficient corner
equilibrium in structure B, C, or D.  This increase in equilibrium degree of moral
hazard is Pareto improving since the expansion of the network of division of labor
increases aggregate productivity, which outweighs increased moral hazard.  This
again highlights the trade-offs between economies of specialization and
endogenous and exogenous transaction costs.28
This theory has an interesting empirical implication.  It predicts that the
equilibrium size of the firm may decrease when division of labor develops between
firms as a result of improvements in measurement (or pricing) efficiency of goods
which is faster than that for labor.  Empirical evidence to support the hypothesis can
be found in Liu and Yang (2000) and Murakami, Liu, and Otsuka (1996), who show
that productivity, level of division of labor, and per capita real income increase and
the average size of firms declines concurrently as transaction conditions are improved
more rapidly for goods than that for labor.
6
V. Concluding Remarks
The model in this paper supports the spirit of the GHM model by absorbing
Maskin, Tirole, Holmstrom, and Milgrom’s critiques of the theory of incomplete
contract.  It shows that the spirit of the GHM model can be kept in the absence of
indescribility of infinite contingent states and of renegotiation if the trade-off
between moral hazard and monitoring or measurement costs of goods and labor is
introduced in a general equilibrium version of the GHM model.  In the extended
GHM model, it is relative measurement cost of different goods and factors rather
than prohibitively high absolute contract writing cost that matters.  It shows that
contingent incomplete labor contracts can be used to avoid direct pricing and
marketing of output and input of the activity that involves prohibitively high
measurement cost and related moral hazard, meanwhile getting the activity involved
in the division of labor.  The labor contract is incomplete since it may not specify
exactly what the employee has to do and it requires the employee to do whatever
she is directed to do.  Ex ante specified ownership of whatever produced by the
                                                
6 Increasingly more common business practice of down-sizing, disintegration, outsourcing, and
focusing on core competency also supports the model in this paper (see Hart, 1995).29
employee and asymmetric claims to residual returns and decision rights, together
with exclusive rights to the company name (firm specific asset), is a very
sophisticated way to indirectly pricing those intellectual properties, such as
management know-how, which are too intangible to be directly priced even via a
patent law.  Hence, contingent incomplete labor contract can increase aggregate
productivity by promoting the division of labor between the production of
intangible intellectual properties and the production tangible goods.30
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